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CASENOTES 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- FIVE YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE 
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS THAT COMMENCES 
WHEN AN INJURY OCCURS IS CONSTITUTIONAL. Hill v. Fitz-
gerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985). 
In February of 1975, a physician misdiagnosed a patient as suffering 
from multiple sclerosis. 1 The physician continued to treat the patient 
based upon this misdiagnosis until November of 1975.2 Thereafter, the 
patient's deteriorated condition continued and the patient sought the 
care of another doctor. 3 On December 5, 1980, the second doctor per-
formed surgery on the patient which revealed that the patient had actu-
ally been suffering from a spinai tumor. The tumor left the patient 
permanently paralyzed from the waist down. 4 
On December 2, 1983, the patient filed a malpractice action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland against his ini-
tial physician for negligent misdiagnosis. 5 The physician moved for sum-
mary jqdgment, contending that Maryland's medical malprac~ice statute 
of limitation, section 5-109 of the Court's Article, barred the patient's 
cause of action. 6 The patient argued that section 5-109 was inapplicable 
because the misdiagnosis occurred before section 5-109 became effective.7 
The federal court certified to the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
three questions of law to determine the applicability of section 5-109.8 
1. See Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 694, 501 A.2d 27, 29 (1985). The parties stipu-
lated that "the initial misdiagnosis of multiple sclerosis was made not later than 
February of 1975." /d. 
2. /d. at 692, 501 A.2d at 28. The physician concluded treatment when he told the 
patient that he could do nothing more to correct the patient's multiple sclerosis. 
Brief for Appellee at 6, Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985). 
3. 304 Md. at 692, 501 A.2d at 28. 
4. Brief for Appellant, at 3, Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985). 
5. 304 Md. at 692, 501 A.2d at 28. 
6. /d. at 693, 501 A.2d at 28-29. The physician argued that the statute of limitations 
commenced on the last day of treatment, November 5, 1975. Because the patient 
failed to file his medical malpractice action within five years of that day, his claim 
was barred. /d. at 694, 501 A.2d at 28-29. 
7. /d. at 693, 501 A.2d at 29. The patient asserted that section 5-109 became effective 
on July 1, 1975. He reasoned that, because his "injury" occurred before section 5-
109's effective date, section 5-101 should be the applicable statute. Under section 5-
101, he had three years from the date of discovery to file his action. He discovered 
the misdiagnosis on December 5, 1980, and filed his action on December 2, 1983. 
Therefore, his action was filed within section 5-101 's three year limitation period. 
/d. 
8. Id. at 691, 501 A.2d at 28. See Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Mo. 
Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§§ 12-601 to -609 (1984 & Supp. 1987). The certi-
fied questions were as follows: 
1. Where there is a continuous course of medical treatment for a single 
medical condition, where such treatment begins before July 1, 1975, and 
concludes after July, 1975, is§ 5-109 the applicable statute of limitations? 
2. If§ 5-109 is the applicable statute of limitations under such circum-
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The court of appeals held: (1) section 5-109 is only applicable to injuries 
occurring after July 1, 1975,9 (2) the limitations period of section 5-109 
commences when the plaintiff suffers some harm caused by the defen-
dant's negligent act, 10 and (3) section 5-109 is constitutional even though 
it bars medical malpractice actions that are filed more than five years 
after the plaintiff's injury occurs. 11 
Legislatures have enacted limitation statutes that restrict the 
amount of time a plaintiff may institute an action to insulate the judicial 
system from stale claims, to ensure actions are instituted promptly, and 
to treat defendants fairly. 12 Plaintiffs who fail to enforce their legal 
rights diligently within a reasonable time should be precluded from forc-
ing another to defend against legal action for past acts. 13 Otherwise, tort 
victims could bring legal action when "evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 14 
Although legislatures, through limitation statutes, have attempted 
to treat plaintiffs and defendants fairly, public policy concerns for de-
fendants traditionally have outweighed those of plaintiffs. 15 Reflecting 
these concerns, limitation periods ran from o.ne to three years in length 16 
and commenced when a cause of action "accrued."17 Under the tradi-
tional approach, accrual dates were strictly construed by the courts. 
Consequently, limitation periods began when the alleged negligent act or 
omission occurred. 18 Claims brought after the specified period were 
stances, when does the five (5) year portion of that statute begin to run, 
and when does the three (3) year portion of that statute begin to run? 
3. Is § 5-109 unconstitutional as being in violation of Article 19 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights? 
9. 304 Md. at 698-99, 501 A.2d at 32. 
10. Id. at 697, 501 A.2d at 31. 
11. Id. at 703, 501 A.2d at 34. 
12. See Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); 
New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 425, 241 A.2d 633, 636 
(1968); see also 1 Wooo, LIMITATIONS 8-9 (4th ed. 1916); Developments in the Law 
- Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1171, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter 
Developments). · 
13. See Ridd1esbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868); Developments, 
supra note 12, at 1185; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 
165 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON). 
14. See Railroad Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 349; see also Wooo, supra note 12, at 8-11; 
D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 259-60 (1973 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter 
HARNEY). 
15. See Developments, supra note 12, at 1205 ("As between the duly diligent plaintiff 
and the wrongdoer, the courts have been unnecessarily sympathetic towards the 
latter .... ") 
16. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2 (Burns 1963) (two years); Mo. CTs. & Juo. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1957) (three years); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 
(1969) (two years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.11 (1974) (one year); TEX. REV. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1985) (two years) (citing art. 5526). 
17. See Developments, supra note 12, at 1200. R. Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of 
Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 CoRNELL L.Q. 339, 357-58 
(1962). 
18. E.g., Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Va. 1976); Cappuci v. Barone, 266 
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barred even if the delay in bringing the action was justified. 19 
Ordinarily, a tort victim knows he has a cause of action when he 
perceives some physical harm and links that harm to the negligent act of 
another. 20 In medical malpractice cases, however, a patient's injury 
often manifests in an injury that is identifiable only by those specially 
educated and trained in the health field. 21 Patients who have sustained 
such "inherently unknowable" harm often fail to realize within the limi-
tations period that a cause of action has accrued. 22 Under the traditional 
approach, their actions were barred even though they had no indication 
that a cause of action existed. 23 
To avoid this harsh result, courts began to liberally interpret the 
accrual date by implementing the "discovery rule."24 Under this rule, 
the statutory period commences when the patient either knows or, 
through due diligence, should have known that a wrong was committed 
against him.25 Consequently, the common law discovery rule furnishes 
medical malpractice plaintiffs with a longer, more equitable amount of 
time to bring suit. 26 
The traditional limitation statute also was mitigated by the "contin-
uing course of treatment rule."27 When a physician's negligence consists 
Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653, 654-55 (1929); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 182 
A.2d 660 (1962); 1976 N.M. Laws 13. See also Comment, An Analysis of State 
Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1429 
("an act or omission and not the resulting damage . . . gives rise to a cause of 
action") [hereinafter Legislative Responses]; 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE 1111 13.06 n. 50 (1986) (hereinafter LoUISELL & WILLIAMS]. 
19. See United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1958); see also Legislative 
Responses, supra note 18, at 1429; Developments, supra note 12, at 1200. 
20. See Reid, 251 F.2d at 694; see also Developments, supra note 12, at 1203; Abrahams, 
Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 Mo. L. REV. 489, 501-02 
(1977); Annotation, Where Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Ac-
tions Against Physicians, Surgeons, or Dentists for Malpractice, 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 372 
(1961 & 1970 & Supp. 1986) (hereinafter Annotation, Statute of Limitations]. 
21. See Developments, supra note 12, at 1222. 
22. /d.; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 165; Developments, supra note 
12, at 1201. 
23. See, e.g., Hil.l v. Hays, 193 Kan. 453, 395 P.2d 298 (1964); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 
Me. 228, 182 A.2d 660 (1962). 
24. See, e.g., Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); 
Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555 (La. Ct. App. 1934); Femandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 
434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660,453 P.2d 631 (1969); see 
also 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 11 13.07; Annotation, Statute of 
Limitations, supra note 18, at 387; Legislative Responses, supra note 18, at 1431-32. 
25. See 1 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 11 13.07. 
26. See, e.g., Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii 150, 433 P.2d 220 (1967); Lipsey v. 
Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); see also Arinotation, Statute of Limitations, supra note 20, 
at 387; 1 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 11 13.07; Developments, supra 
note 12, at 1200. . 
27. See Lillich, supra note 17, at 334-37; Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Com-
mences to Run Against Actions Against Physicians, Surgeons, or Dentists/or Malprac-
tice, 74 A.L.R. 1317, 1322-24 (1931); Annotation, When Statute of Limitations 
Commences to Run Against Actions Against Physicians, Surgeons, or Dentists for 
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of a continuing course of misconduct or impropriety within a course of 
treatment, the continuing treatment rule tolls the limitation statute until 
treatment for the particular illness or condition has terminated. 28 The 
rule is inapplicable, however, when the patient knows or, through due 
diligence, should know that negligence occurred during treatment. 29 
As a result of the discovery rule and the continuing course of treat-
ment rule, the number of medical malpractice plaintiffs expanded sub-
stantially. 30 The insurance industry and medical profession claim that 
this expansion has contributed significantly to the current medical mal-
practice insurance crisis.31 By extending the amount of time between a 
medical treatment and final resolution of all claims connected with that 
treatment, 32 the two rules create a "long tail" to medical malpractice 
actions. 33 Also, under these rules, the length of the limitations period 
Malpractice, 144 A.L.R. 209, 227-34 (1943); Annotation, Statute of Limitations, 
supra note 20, at 384-86. New York codified this rule in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law§ 214-
a (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). 
28. E.g., McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351 
(1982); Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777,237 N.Y.S.2d 
319 (1962). See 1 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at~ 13.08. 
The continuing treatment rule is often applied when a surgeon leaves a foreign 
object in a patient's body and continues to treat the patient without discovering the 
object. See, e.g., Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); Sly v. 
Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y.S. 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1923). 
In some jurisdictions that recognize the continuing treatment rule, the statutes 
commence when the doctor-patient relationship terminates. See Ballenger v. Crow-
ell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978); Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 
N.E. 238 (1919). In other jurisdictions, the statutes commence when the last negli-
gent act occurs. See Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950); Hotelling 
v. Walther, 169 Or. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942). 
29. See, e.g., Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958); 
Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978); McFarland v. Con-
nally, 252 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). But see Ishler v. Miller, 56 Ohio St. 2d 
447, 384 N.E.2d 296 (1978) (discovery rule should not apply to the period prior to 
termination of the doctor-patient relationship). 
30. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Con-
stitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REv. 759, 760-01 (1977); Abrahams, supra note 
20, at 490-92; 2 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at~ 20.07. 
31. See Annas, Katz, & Trakimas, Medical Malpractice Litigation Under National 
Health Insurance: Essential or Expendable? 1975 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1336 n.7 [here-
inafter Annas]; Legislative Responses, supra note 18, at 1417; Redish, supra note 30, 
at 759-60. 
Commentators, however, have expr~sed doubt as to whether a "crisis" exists. 
See Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 637 INs. L.J. 
90 (1976); 2 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at~ 20.07 n.55. 
32. See Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa 1982); Ross v. Kansas 
City Gen. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980). Modification of statutes 
of limitations is viewed by some commentators as having only a minor effect on the 
crisis. See also Abrahams, supra note 20, at 501. (Because statutes of limitation 
deal only with that portion of the tail that is between the negligent act and the filing 
of an action, the impact of limitation reform on the length of the tail is limited.); 
White & McKenna, Constitutionality of Recent Malpractice Legislation, 13 FoRUM 
312, 315 (1977) [hereinafter White & McKenna). 
33. See Redish, supra note 30, at 760-01; Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legis-
lation- A First Checkup, 50 TuL. L.R. 655-73 (1976) [hereinafter Checkup). For 
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depends upon the facts of each case. 34 Insurers complain that, without a 
definite period in which liability can be predicted, they are unable to set 
affordable and adequate insurance premiums.35 Consequently, while pre-
miums have increased and availability has decreased, the additional cost 
has been passed to the patients36 and some physicians have been forced 
to leave their profession.37 
To eliminate the insurers' inability to predict future claims, legisla-
tures enacted medical malpractice statutes of repose. 38 These statutes 
place an absolute bar on the amount of time a patient may file an action 
for medical malpractice. 39 Running from two to ten years in length, 40 
the new statutes of repose commence either when the negligent act oc-
other factors responsible for this medical malpractice crisis, see Learner, Restrictive 
Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" 
Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 145 (1981) 
[hereinafter Compensation Schemes]. 
34. See Redish, supra note 30, at 765. ("[T]he rate-determining process is dependent 
upon knowing with some degree of certainty the total potential losses for a policy 
year, and any extension of the statutory period makes rate-setting that much more 
difficult.")(quoting United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Pub. No. (OS) 
73-88, Medical Malpractice: Report of the Secretary's Comm'n on Medical Mal-
practice 22, 30 (1973)); see also, Legislative Responses, supra note 18, at 1429. 
35. See Redish, supra note 30, at 765; Abrahams, supra 20, at 491-92. 
36. See 2 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at~ 20.07; PROSSER & KEETON, supra 
note 13, at 168; Hirsh, Malpractice Crisis of the '80s, Part 1, 13 LEG. AsP. OF MED. 
PRAC. (10) 5-8 (1985); Redish, supra note 30, at 760-61. 
37. See Legislative Responses, supra note 18, at 1429; Compensation Schemes, supra note 
33, at 143; Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medi-
cal Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 195, 200 n.16 (1985); Hirsh, Malpractice 
Crisis of the '80s, Part 7, 14 LEG. AsP. OF MED. PRAC. (4) 3, 4 (1986). 
38. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 95.11(4)(b) (West 1982) (maximum four-year limit); 
IowA CoDE ANN. § 614.1.9 (West 1986) (maximum six-year limit); LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 9.5628(A) (West 1983) (maximum three-year limit). See also Halla-
gan & Hirsh, Statute of Limitations- On a Clear Day You Can See Forever, 14 
LEG. AsP. OF MED. PRAC. (1) 1, 3 (1986); Legislative Responses, supra 18, at 1432-
36; Redish, supra note 30, at 766; 1 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at ~ 
13.01-.02; 2 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at ~ 20.07; PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 13, at 167. 
Other forms of malpractice legislation include "(1) elimination of the ad 
damnum clause from pleadings; (2) modification of the collateral source rule; (3) 
limitations on the kind and amount of damages recoverable; (4) mandatory insur-
ance; (5) abolition of punitive damages; and (6) establishment of screening panels or 
mandatory arbitration." White & McKenna, supra note 32, at 312 n.2. 
39. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CoDE§ 340.5 (West 1982) (action must be commenced 
within three years of injury or discovery, whichever is first); COLO. REv. STAT. 
§ 13-80-105 (1973) (discovery rule with six-year cap); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 95.11(4)(a) (West 1982) (discovery rule with four-year cap); IowA CoDE ANN. 
§ 614.1.9 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(c) (1983) (modified dis-
covery rule with four-year cap); LA. REv. STAT. 9:5628A (West 1983) (modified 
discovery rule with three-year cap); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 516.105 (Supp. 1986) (modi-
fied discovery rule with ten-year cap); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (1981) 
(within one year of accrual and four-year cap); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 29-26-116 
(1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 10.01 (Vernon 1977) (two-year 
absolute limit). 
40. See supra note 39. 
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curs or when the claimant suffers harm as a result of that act.41 Many of 
these statutes allow exceptions for minors and for others whose delay in 
filing an action was caused by the physician's fraudulent concealment or 
by the surgeon's failure to remove foreign objects.42 
Plaintiffs have argued that the absolute time limitation on the right 
of action violates, inter alia, due process, equal protection, and the right 
of access to the courts.43 To determine the constitutionality of these stat-
utes, courts have applied either the rational basis test or the strict scru-
tiny test. 44 When a statute discriminates against a suspect class or 
significantly interferes with a fundamental right, courts implement the 
strict scrutiny test.45 Under the strict scrutiny test, a statute is upheld 
only if a compelling state interest is furthered and the regulation is neces-
sary to achieve that state interest.46 Under the rational basis test, how-
ever, a statute is upheld if it serves a legitimate state interest and the 
interference rationally furthers that interest.47 
The constitutionality of the statutes of repose are usually upheld 
under the rational basis test.48 Courts have held that the strict scrutiny 
41. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-564A (repealed 1985) (date of injury); IND. 
CoDE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1986) (date of negligent act); ORE. REv. 
STAT. § 12.110(4) (1983) (date of negligent act); see also HARNEY, supra note 14, at 
§§ 8.5, 8.1(B) (1977 & Supp. 1980). 
42. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. PRo. CoDE§ 340.5 (West 1982) (commencement of action may 
exceed maximum three-year limitation for fraud, intentional concealment, foreign 
object, or a minor); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-105 (1973) (exceptions for foreign 
objects); ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.110(4) (1983) (action must be brought within two 
years after fraud discovered or should have been discovered). 
43. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (due process, equal 
protection, and access to courts); Austin v. Lituak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984) (due 
process and equal protection); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984) 
(equal protection); Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983) (due pro-
cess and equal protection); Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985) (access to 
courts). See also Smith, supra note 37, at 222; White & McKenna, supra note 32, at 
312. 
44. See Redish, supra note 30, at 769-70; Smith, supra note 37, at 214. 
45. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 300, 
338-339 (1972). A fundamental right is one which is "explicitly or implicitly guar-
anteed by the constitution." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 u.s. 1, 33-34 (1973). 
46. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1. Under this test, the Supreme Court usually will find 
the statute irrational. 
47. See, e.g., Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 
(1984); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 
u.s. 166 (1980). 
The interference is constitutional if it is reasonable, not wholly arbitrary or 
capricious. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parnish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia 
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 530 (1934); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). See 
also Legislative Responses, supra note 18, at 1420. 
48. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (lOth Cir. 1984); Reese v. Rankin 
Fite Memorial Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 
S.W.2d 543 (1976); Kite v. Campbell, 142 Cal. App. 3d 793, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 
(1983); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979), appeal dis-
missed sub nom., Woodward v. Burnham City Hosp., 449 U.S. 807 (1980); Laughlin 
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test is inappliable because statutes of repose are considered only a proce-
dural bar to a remedial action, not a substantive bar to the underlying 
right to bring an action.49 Notwithstanding, some courts have held that 
these statutes are constitutional under the rational basis test because no 
legitimate state interest existed. 50 Other courts have held that these stat-
utes are constitutional under the strict scrutiny test because the statute 
barred the underlying right to bring an action and no compelling state 
interest justified the interference. 5 1 
In Maryland, before the alleged medical malpractice insurance cri-
sis, medical malpractice actions were governed by section 5-101 of the 
Court's Article.52 Section 5-101 is a general statute of limitation that 
bars civil actions that are filed more than three years after the action has 
accrued. 53 As a general rule, limitations against civil actions commenced 
when the alleged wrong occurred, not when the alleged wrong was dis-
covered. 54 Recognizing the inequity of this rule as applied to diligent 
v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1968). But cf American Bank & Trust v. Com-
munity Hosp., 33 Cal. 3d 674, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371, 660 P.2d 829 (1983) (damage 
statute invalidated because irrational); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 89 (R.I. 
1983) (medical malpractice statutes unconstitutional because alleged malpractice 
"crisis" no longer exists); see also Smith, supra note 37, at 208-09. 
49. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945) (limit that bars only reme-
dial right does not create a property right protected by the due process clause and 
therefore does not destroy the fundamental right of access); Hargraves v. Brackett 
Stripping Machine Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 682-83 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (if not arbitrary 
or capricious, statute of limitation does not violate due process); see also Develop-
ments, supra note 12, at 1186-88 (distinguishing between substantive and procedural 
effects of statutes of limitation). 
50. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (maximum limit unconstitu-
tional under rational basis test because it placed an unreasonable condition on right 
of access). Cf American Bank & Trust v. Community Hosp., 33 Cal. 3d 674, 190 
Cal. Rptr. 371, 660 P.2d 829 (1983) (damages statute invalidated under rational 
basis test). 
51. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (the right to bring a medical 
. malpractice action is a fundamental right; intermediate test used to invalidate stat-
ute); Carson v. Mauer, 120 N.H. 925, 936, 424 A.2d 825, 833 (1980) (statute of 
limitations cannot run until injury and cause are discovered; strict scrutiny applied 
to invalidate statute); Ayers v. Horgen, 397 Pa. 282, 294, 154 A.2d 788, 794 (1959) 
(without judicial discretion to apply discovery rule, statute of limitations is uncon-
stitutional as a deprivation of due process); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 
1984). Cf White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983) (damage cap unconstitu-
tional under strict scrutiny). See also Comment, Blasting the Cap: Constitutional 
Issues Arising from Maryland's Limitation of Nonecomonic Damages in Personal In-
jury Claims, 16 U. BALT. L. REv. 326 (1987). 
52. See Lutheran Hosp. v. Levy, 60 Md. App. 227, 482 A.2d 23 (1984), cert. denied, 302 
Md. 288, 487 A.2d 292 (1985); Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A.2d 389 
(1980); Walko v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 281 Md. 207, 378 A.2d 1100 (1977). 
53. MD. Crs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984) provides: 
A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it ac-
crues unless another provision of the code provides a different period of 
time within which an action shall be commenced. 
54. See Killen v. George Wash. Cemetery, 231 Md. 337, 190 A.2d 247 (1963). 
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medical malpractice plaintiffs,55 Maryland courts applied the discovery 
rule and the continuing course of treatment rule where equity dictated. 56 
In reaction to the medical malpractice crisis, however, the Maryland 
General Assembly passed section 5-109 of the Court's Article.57 To limit 
health care provider liability and provide insurers with a predictable pe-
riod of potential liability, section 5-109 places a five-year or three-year 
limitation period on medical malpractice actions:58 
An action for damages for an injury arising out of the rendering 
of or failure to render professional services by a health care pro-
vider . . . shall be filed 
(1) within five years of the time the injury was commit-
ted, or 
(2) within three years of the date when the injury was 
discovered, whichever is the shorter. 
The only express exception to section 5-109 is for claimants under the 
age of sixteen. 59 
55. See Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966); Hahn v. Clay-
brook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917). 
56. See Waldman, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825. 
57. 1975 MD. LAWS 545 (codified as MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 
(1984)). See also Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland's 
Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74, 77-78 (1980); 
Note, Poffenberger v. Risser-The Discovery Principle is the Rule, Not the Exception, 
41 MD. L. REV. 451, 459 n.63 (1982). 
58. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 5-109 (1984). 
Although section 5-109 as originally enacted in 1975 was repealed and replaced 
by the Md. General Assembly 1987 MD. LAWS 592 (codified as MD. Crs. & JuD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (Supp. 1987)), the statutory language used in the new 
section 5-109 is similar to the old section 5-109. Therefore, the Hill court's interpre-
tation of 5-109 is still relevant. · 
Subsection (a) of new section 5-109 provides: 
An action for damages for an injury arising out of the rendering of or 
failure to render professional services by a health care provider ... shall be 
filed within the earlier of: 
(l) Five years of the time the injury was committed; or 
(2) Three years of the date the injury was discovered. 
59. MD. Crs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 5-109 states: "If the claimant was under 16 
years of age at the time the injury was committed, the time shall commence when he 
reaches the age of 16." 
New section 5-109 provides the following exceptions: 
(b) Actions by claimants under age 11. -Except as provided in sub-
section (c) of this section, if the claimant was under the age of 11 yearS at 
the time the injury was committed, the time limitations prescribed in sub-
section (a) of this section shall commence when the claimant reaches the 
age of 11 years. 
(c) Exceptions to age limitations in certain actions. -
(I) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section may not be applied 
to an action for damages for an injury: 
(i) To the reproductive system of the claimant; or 
(ii) Caused by a foreign object negligently left in the claimant's 
body. 
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In Hill v. Fitzgerald, 60 the Court of Appeals of Maryland deter-
mined the applicability, operation, and constitutionality of section 5-109. 
Under section 5-109, the three-year period begins upon the plaintiff's 
subjective discovery of an injury.61 The five-year period, however, begins 
when "injury" first occurs. 62 Injury occurs when the alleged negligent 
act is first coupled with some harm. 63 The court determined that the 
five-year limitation is an absolute bar to medical malpractice actions64 
and cannot be extended by judicial mitigators. 65 Finally, the court held 
section 5-109 constitutional under Article 19 of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights. 66 Applying the rational basis test, the court declared that 
the statute is a reasonable limitation rationally related to the statute's 
purpose - containing the long tail effect. 67 
Section 5-109 modifies the common law discovery rule in two ways. 
First, section 5-109 allows a patient to file an action up to three years 
after he discovers an injury, but in no event longer than five years from 
the date the injury actually occurred.68 Under common law, a patient 
had three years from discovery to institute an action regardless of when 
discovery occurred, as long as the discovery was reasonable. 69 This time 
period offered the patient a fair and equitable time to file suit. 
Under section 5-109, however, the common law discovery rule and 
its underlying equitable principles are cut off after a period of only five 
(2) In an action for damages for an injury described in this subsec-
tion, if the claimant was under the age of 16 years at the time the injury 
was committed, the time limitations prescribed in subsection (a) of this 
section shall commence when the claimant reaches the age of 16 years. 
(d) Effect of filing claim. -For the purposes of this section, the 
filing of a claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office in accordance 
with § 3-2A-04 of this article shall be deemed the filing of an action. 
(e) Effect of other provisions. - The provisions of § 5-201 of this 
title that relate to a cause of action of a minor may not be construed as 
limiting the application of subsections (b) or (c) of this section. 
(f) Application. - Nothing contained in this section may be con-
strued as limiting the application of the provisions of: 
(1) § 5-201 of this title that relate to a cause of action of a mental 
incompetent; or (2) § 5-203 of this title (fraud). 
60. 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27. 
61. See Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 699, 501 A.2d 27, 39 (1985). 
62. /d. at 696-97, 501 A.2d at 30-32. In Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 447 A.2d 
860 (1982), the Court of Appeals of Maryland interpreted the term "injury" in the 
context of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act contained in the Court's Article. 
63. Hill, 304 Md. at 699-700, 501 A.2d at 32. 
64. /d. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. at 703, 501 A.2d at 34. Article 19 guarantees the right of access to the courts. 
See MD. CoNST. D. OF R., art. 19. 
67. /d. at 703, 501 A.2d at 34. 
68. Hill, 304 Md. at 699, 501 A.2d at 32. "The five-year maximum period ... will run 
its full length only ... where the three-year discovery provision does not operate to 
bar an action at an earlier date." /d. at 700, 501 A.2d at 32-33. 
69. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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years.70 Neither physical manifestation of injury nor knowledge of the 
cause of action is relevant. 71 Consequently, the absolute maximum time 
limit may bar remedial action at law before the patient discovers or could 
discover that a wrong occurred. 72 Therefore, the discovery rule under 
section 5-109 is useless to an injured patient who is unable to detect any 
harm or distinguish between residual effects and negligently caused 
results. 
Second, under section 5-109, "discovery" of a cause of action appar-
ently occurs when the patient actually discovers his injury.73 Under this 
subjective standard, the patient's failure to act reasonably is irrelevant. 
Under common law, discovery occurred when a reasonable person in the 
same or similar circumstances would have or should have discovered the 
injury.74 By replacing the objective standard with a subjective standard, 
section 5-l 09 provides patients, who unreasonably fail to discover their 
injury, the benefit of additional time. 
Notwithstanding, this subjective standard is insignificant to those 
patients whose injuries fail to manifest within five years after the mal-
practice occurs, whether that patient acts reasonably or not. Even a pa-
tient who acts reasonably will not discover an injury that is identifiable 
only by those who are specially educated and trained in the health field. 
Therefore, a patient who sustains an inherently undiscoverable injury 
must either bring an action in the absence of discovered injury or risk 
being barred from recovery. 
Finally, section 5-109 also deviates from the common law by abro-
gating the continuing course of treatment rule. 75 Despite the need to rely 
upon the special skill, knowledge, and judgment of physicians, 76 patients 
no longer will be able to rely upon the confidential relationship they have 
with their physicians as a means to postpone the running of the limita-
tions statute.77 The Hill court apparently concluded that the need to 
limit the amount of time in which medical malpractice claims are filed 
outweighs the patient's need to rely upon the confidential relationship he 
70. Hill, 304 Md. at 699-700, 501 A.2d at 32. 
71. /d. at 700, 501 A.2d at 33. 
72. See Developments, supra note 12, at 1201 ("Especially where the plaintiff is unquali-
fied to ascertain the imperfection, as in the case of negligent performance of expert 
or professional services, it seems harsh to begin the period at the time of the defend-
ant's act."). 
73. MD. Crs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984). 
74. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
75. See Hill, 304 Md. at 700, 501 A.2d at 32. The express language of section 5-109 
does not allow for judicially implied exceptions. /d. New subsection (f) of section 
5-109 makes clear that section 5-109 does not limit either section 5-201, relating to 
mental incompentency, or section 5-203, the general fraud statute. Mo. Crs. & 
Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (Supp. 1987). 
76. See Comment, The Continuous Treatment Doctrine: A Toll on the Statute of Limita-
tions for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49 ALB. L. REV. 70 (1984). 
77. l J. Dooley, MODERN TORT LAW§ 4.18, at liS n.1 (1982) ("As a general proposi-
tion, a plaintiff is not bound to anticipate negligent conduct on the part of others. 
Rather, he may assume that others will fulfill their duties."). 
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has with his physician. Consequently, patients are forced to anticipate 
malpractice and institute premature actions to protect their potential re-
covery. 78 Also, physicians who discover their negligence may conceal it 
intentionally from their patients until the limitations period expires.79 
The constitutionality of section 5-l 09 was upheld under the rational 
basis test. 80 The Hill court recognized that the legislature's purpose in 
enacting the statute was to remedy the current medical malpractice in-
surance crisis.81 Section 5-109 reduces the time claimants have to file 
suit and establishes a definite period of liability for health care provid-
ers.82 Consequently, the actual number of claims filed is reduced. Im-
plicitly, the court concluded that reducing the number of claims is a 
reasonable means of containing the insurance crisis. Nevertheless, section 
5-l 09 penalizes innocent malpractice victims while immunizing negligent 
health care providers from liability.83 These results were recognized by 
the legislature and the court, but in light of the crisis, the court believed 
that the balance between the competing interests was fair and 
reasonable. 84 
In rejecting the strict scrutiny test, the court found that no "signifi-
cant interference" with a fundamental right had occurred. 85 The court 
explained that a limitation statute that merely restricts the plaintiff's 
remedy, not his general right to bring an action, is constitutional pro-
vided the restriction is reasonable. 86 Following this premise, both the 
three and five-year periods were deemed reasonable in relation to the leg-
islature's purpose. 87 
Although the court's reasoning is supported by precedent, section 5-
109 significantly interferes with the right of access for potential plaintiffs 
who fail to discover their injuries within the maximum limitation pe-
78. See Annas, supra note 31, at 1343. 
79. HARNEY, supra note 14, at 250. 
80. See Hill, 304 Md. at 700-04, 501 A.2d at 33-34. 
81. See id. at 700, 501 A.2d at 32. 
82. See id. at 703, 501 A.2d at 34. See Abrahams, supra note 20, at 501. 
83. See Checkup, supra note 33, at 674. "The danger in legislation of 'this type' is that it 
is designed to reduce malpractice claims by indiscriminately barring causes of action 
without regard to their validity." Id. at 673. 
84. See id. Only if the court had found the statute completely irrational could it have 
substituted its judgment for that of the legislature. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981) ("[I]t is up to the legislatures, not courts, to 
decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."); Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State 
Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32,48-49, 300 A.2d 367, 378 (1973) ("The wisdom 
and expediency of a law adopted in the exercise of police power of the State is not 
subject to judicial review . . . . "). 
85. See Hill, 304 Md. at 701, 501 A.2d at 33. 
86. See id. at 702-03, 501 A.2d at 33-34; see also Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 66 A.2d 
795 (1949). 
87. See id. at 703, 501 A,.2d at 34. Although the discovery rule seems more fair, claim-
ants have no vested interest in any common law rule. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113, 134 (1876); Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 360, 
499 A.2d 178, 189 (1985). Statutes of limitation should not be held unconstitutional 
unless plainly unreasonable. See Wooo, supra note 12, at 54. 
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riod. 88 The only method by which medical malpractice victims can be 
compensated for their injuries is through the judicial process. By bring-
ing action against a negligent health care provider, money damages can 
be awarded and victims can be made as close to whole as possible. Under 
section 5-109, however, five years after the negligent act causes some 
harm, the right of access to the courts is extinguished. 89 Nevertheless, 
because statutes of limitation are considered imperative to fulfill impor-
tant public policy, the court believed that the disadvantage caused is an 
unfortunate but inevitable consequence. 90 
Under Hill, the limitations period for filing medical malpractice ac-
tions is, at most, five years from the date a negligent act first causes harm. 
The patient who fails to discover his injury and institute an action during 
this period is barred from remedial action. In spite of this harsh result, 
section 5-l 09 is constitutional as a reasonable legislative response to the 
alleged medical malpractice insurance crisis. The need to curb physi-
cian's insurance premiums is an important public policy goal. Unfortu-
nately, the meritorious claims of innocent malpractice victims are 
sacrificed while negligent health care providers are immunized from 
liability. · 
Nancy E. Leibowitz 
88. See Phelan v. Hanft, 471 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), appeal dismissed, 
488 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1986). 
89. Hill, 304 Md. at 699-700, 501 A.2d at 32. 
90. See Wood supra note 12, at 9; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 165; 
51 Am. Jur. 2d § 138 (1970 & Supp. 1986). 
